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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #7558-80/1
20 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa ☐

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1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. ☐

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2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 18 November 1980 with the A/NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. ☐

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Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 25

ZIMBABWE

While cognizant of the immense problems facing Zimbabwe--the economy, demobilization of the guerrillas, the formation of a new army, and meeting black expectations--analysts, perhaps mindful of how bad things could have been, remain basically optimistic that Mugabe can control the situation. A fundamental problem facing him is the friction between the ZAPU and ZANU. The recent factional fighting in Bulawayo which left 55 persons dead underscores the animosity and deep suspicion with which the two groups view each other. Analysts do not believe this incident presages country-wide strife or civil war but are concerned about the movement of heavy weapons from Zambia to ZAPU forces in western Zimbabwe, especially if this occurred without Mugabe's authorization. More Bulawayo-like incidents are to be expected until the issue of the disposition of the guerrilla forces is finally resolved. 25X1

The Tekere trial remains a delicate problem for Mugabe regardless of its outcome. 25X1

ZAMBIA

The vulnerability of the Kaunda regime to overthrow is greater now than it has been since the Zimbabwe settlement. This is not to say that this is an imminent possibility, but Kaunda's position seems increasingly precarious, and the situation in Zambia requires very close watching. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the government's performance, especially in the economic area, to which Kaunda has mainly responded with repressive measures. He seems unwilling or unable to take steps to ameliorate the causes of dissatisfaction and has become increasingly isolated in the process. 25X1

SOMALIA

Analysts were more concerned this month that Somali President Siad is experiencing mounting domestic pressure as a result of the decline of the economy, the decline in military prospects in the Ogaden, and the growing perception that the new relationship with the United States

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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shows little promise of benefiting Somalia militarily. Siad, anticipating this growing domestic pressure, probably bought time by his declaration of a state of emergency and the reintroduction of military rule. The prospects that a new US Administration might be more forthcoming also provide Siad some breathing space. Most analysts believe, however, that Siad's prospects will continue to decline and that his rule could become seriously threatened by spring. This threat would come from the military. ☐

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CHAD

The situation has changed significantly over the past few months with the introduction of Libyan troops (500 in Ndjamena and about 3,000 in the north) and equipment. The Libyan aim is the elimination of the Habre forces, the establishment of a compliant regime in Ndjamena and the annexation of the mineral rich northern part of Chad. The Egyptians and Sudanese, who have been aiding Habre, will continue to aid him should he, as seems likely, be driven from the capital and forced to resort to guerrilla warfare. The Libyans are aware of this support to Habre and are attempting to stop it through military operations in the north, particularly around Abeche. The Libyans also have been training and arming dissidents from western Sudan. Details are lacking concerning the extent of this program, and analysts at this time do not see it becoming a serious threat to Sudan. It is the view of some analysts that should Habre resort to guerrilla warfare and inflict damage on the Libyan forces, Libya would try to increase pressure against Sudan. The French are coming under increasing pressure to act decisively from African states who are alarmed at Libyan behavior in Chad and elsewhere. The French, however, are restrained by domestic considerations, i.e., the upcoming elections and the need to avoid casualties, and a protracted military commitment. One option available to the French short of committing troops would be to provide arms and financial aid to Habre. A suitable pretext for direct French intervention would be if the anti-Habre coalition wins and then turns on the Libyans, a development not without precedence in Chad. ☐

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